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Security Analysis of PRINCE

Jérémy Jean 1, * Ivica Nikolic 2 Thomas Peyrin 2 Lei Wang 2 Shuang Wu 2 
* Corresponding author
1 CASCADE - Construction and Analysis of Systems for Confidentiality and Authenticity of Data and Entities
DI-ENS - Département d'informatique - ENS Paris, Inria Paris-Rocquencourt, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique : UMR 8548
Abstract : In this article, we provide the first third-party security analysis of the PRINCE lightweight block cipher, and the underlying PRINCE_core. First, while no claim was made by the authors regarding related-key attacks, we show that one can attack the full cipher with only a single pair of related keys, and then reuse the same idea to derive an attack in the single-key model for the full PRINCE_core for several instances of the α parameter (yet not the one randomly chosen by the designers). We also show how to exploit the structural linear relations that exist for PRINCE in order to obtain a key recovery attack that slightly breaks the security claims for the full cipher. We analyze the application of integral attacks to get the best known key-recovery attack on a reduced version of the PRINCE cipher. Finally, we provide time-memory-data tradeoffs, that require only known plaintext-ciphertext data, and that can be applied to full PRINCE.
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Submitted on : Monday, October 7, 2013 - 12:40:18 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, March 17, 2022 - 10:08:37 AM
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  • HAL Id : hal-00870448, version 1



Jérémy Jean, Ivica Nikolic, Thomas Peyrin, Lei Wang, Shuang Wu. Security Analysis of PRINCE. FSE 2013, Mar 2013, Singapore, Singapore. ⟨hal-00870448⟩



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