Robust Encryption

Abstract : We provide a provable-security treatment of "robust" encryption. Robustness means it is hard to produce a ciphertext that is valid for two different users. Robustness makes explicit a property that has been implicitly assumed in the past. We argue that it is an essential conjunct of anonymous encryption. We show that natural anonymity-preserving ways to achieve it, such as adding recipient identification information before encrypting, fail. We provide transforms that do achieve it, efficiently and provably. We assess the robustness of specific encryption schemes in the literature, providing simple patches for some that lack the property. We present various applications. Our work enables safer and simpler use of encryption.
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Communication dans un congrès
Daniele Micciancio. TCC 2010, Feb 2010, Zurich, Switzerland. Springer, 5978, pp.480-497, 2010, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 〈10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_28〉
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-00915836
Contributeur : Michel Abdalla <>
Soumis le : lundi 9 décembre 2013 - 13:44:29
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:22:10

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Michel Abdalla, Mihir Bellare, Gregory Neven. Robust Encryption. Daniele Micciancio. TCC 2010, Feb 2010, Zurich, Switzerland. Springer, 5978, pp.480-497, 2010, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 〈10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_28〉. 〈hal-00915836〉

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