Decentralized Interference Channels with Noisy Feedback Possess Pareto Optimal Nash Equilibria

Samir Perlaza 1 Ravi Tandon 2 H. Vincent Poor 3
1 SOCRATE - Software and Cognitive radio for telecommunications
CITI - CITI Centre of Innovation in Telecommunications and Integration of services, Inria Grenoble - Rhône-Alpes
2 Hume Center and Department of ECE
ECE - Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering [Blacksburg]
Abstract : In this paper, the price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS) of a game arising in a two-user decentralized interference channel (DIC) with noisy feedback in which transmit-receiver pairs seek an optimal individual transmission rate are fully characterized. In particular, it is shown that in all interference regimes, there always exists at least one Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium (NE). More specifically, there always exists an NE at which players maximize the network sum-rate and thus, the PoS of the corresponding game is always equal to one. A second result provides closed form expressions for the PoA, which allows the full characterization of the reduction of the sum rate due to the anarchic behavior of all transmitter- receiver pairs.
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-00957146
Contributor : Samir Perlaza <>
Submitted on : Monday, March 10, 2014 - 8:53:28 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, November 19, 2019 - 12:40:04 PM
Long-term archiving on: Tuesday, June 10, 2014 - 10:41:08 AM

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Samir Perlaza, Ravi Tandon, H. Vincent Poor. Decentralized Interference Channels with Noisy Feedback Possess Pareto Optimal Nash Equilibria. Proc. of the 6th International Symposium on Communications, Control, and Signal Processing (ISCCSP 2014), May 2014, Athens, Greece. ⟨hal-00957146⟩

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