Complete game-theoretic characterization of SIS epidemics protection strategies

Yezekael Hayel 1 Stojan Trajanovski 2, * Eitan Altman 3 Huijuan Wang 4 Piet Van Mieghem 2
* Corresponding author
1 LIA - Laboratoire Informatique d'Avignon
2 Department of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science [Delft]
3 MAESTRO - Models for the performance analysis and the control of networks
CRISAM - Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée
4 TWA - Delft Institute of Applied Mathematics
Abstract : Defining an optimal protection strategy against viruses, spam propagation or any other kind of contamination process is an important feature for designing new networks and architectures. In this work, we consider decentralized optimal protection strategies when a virus is propagating over a network through a Susceptible Infected Susceptible (SIS) epidemic process. We assume that each node in the network can fully protect itself from infection at a constant cost, or the node can use recovery software, once it is infected. We model our system using a game theoretic framework. Based on this model, we find pure and mixed equilibria, and evaluate the performance of the equilibria by finding the Price of Anarchy (PoA) in several network topologies. Finally, we give numerical illustrations of our results.
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Yezekael Hayel, Stojan Trajanovski, Eitan Altman, Huijuan Wang, Piet Van Mieghem. Complete game-theoretic characterization of SIS epidemics protection strategies. IEEE 53rd Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC 2014), Dec 2014, Los Angeles, United States. ⟨hal-01054710⟩

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