A routing game in networks with lossy links

Abstract : Standard assumptions in the theory of routing games are that costs are additive over links and that there is flow conservation. The assumptions typically hold when the costs represent delays. We introduce here a routing game where losses occur on links in a way that may depend on the congestion. In that case both assumptions fail. We study a load balancing network and identify a Kameda type paradox in which by adding capacity, all players suffer larger loss rates.
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Contributor : Eitan Altman <>
Submitted on : Saturday, September 20, 2014 - 2:19:48 PM
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Eitan Altman, Joy Kuri, Rachid El-Azouzi. A routing game in networks with lossy links. 7th International Conference on NETwork Games COntrol and OPtimization (NETGCOOP 2014), Oct 2014, Trento, Italy. ⟨hal-01066453⟩

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