Private asymmetric fingerprinting : a protocol with optimal traitor tracing using Tardos codes

Caroline Fontaine 1, 2 Sébastien Gambs 3 Julien Lolive 3, 1, 2 Cristina Onete 3
Lab-STICC - Laboratoire des sciences et techniques de l'information, de la communication et de la connaissance
3 CIDRE - Confidentialité, Intégrité, Disponibilité et Répartition
CentraleSupélec, Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique , IRISA-D1 - SYSTÈMES LARGE ÉCHELLE
Abstract : Active fingerprinting schemes were originally invented to deter malicious users from illegally releasing an item, such as a movie or an image. To achieve this, each time an item is released, a different fingerprint is embedded in it. If the fingerprint is created from an anti-collusion code, the fingerprinting scheme can trace colluding buyers who forge fake copies of the item using their own legitimate copies. Charpentier, Fontaine, Furon and Cox were the first to propose an asymmetric fingerprinting scheme based on Tardos codes, the most efficient anti-collusion codes known to this day. However, their work focuses on security but does not preserve the privacy of buyers. To address this issue, we introduce the first privacy-preserving asymmetric fingerprinting protocol based on Tardos codes. This protocol is optimal with respect traitor tracing. We also formally define the properties of correctness, anti-framing, traitor tracing, as well as buyer- and item-unlinkability. Finally, we prove that our protocol achieves theseproperties and give exact bounds for each of them.
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Conference papers
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Contributor : Sébastien Gambs <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, December 2, 2014 - 6:52:12 PM
Last modification on : Monday, February 25, 2019 - 3:14:15 PM


  • HAL Id : hal-01090053, version 1


Caroline Fontaine, Sébastien Gambs, Julien Lolive, Cristina Onete. Private asymmetric fingerprinting : a protocol with optimal traitor tracing using Tardos codes. Third International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America (Latincrypt'14), Sep 2014, Florianopolis, Brazil. ⟨hal-01090053⟩



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