Modulus Fault Attacks against RSA-CRT Signatures

Eric Brier 1 David Naccache 2, 3 Phong Q. Nguyen 3, 2 Mehdi Tibouchi 2, 3
2 CASCADE - Construction and Analysis of Systems for Confidentiality and Authenticity of Data and Entities
DI-ENS - Département d'informatique de l'École normale supérieure, Inria Paris-Rocquencourt, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique : UMR 8548
Abstract : RSA-CRT fault attacks have been an active research area since their discovery by Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton in 1997. We present alternative key-recovery attacks on RSA-CRT signatures: instead of targeting one of the sub-exponentiations in RSA-CRT, we inject faults into the public modulus before CRT interpolation, which makes a number of countermeasures against Boneh et al.’s attack ineffective. Our attacks are based on orthogonal lattice techniques and are very efficient in practice: depending on the fault model, between 5 to 45 faults suffice to recover the RSA factorization within a few seconds. Our simplest attack requires that the adversary knows the faulty moduli, but more sophisticated variants work even if the moduli are unknown, under reasonable fault models. All our attacks have been fully validated experimentally with fault-injection laser techniques.
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Communication dans un congrès
Bart Preneel; Tsuyoshi Takagi. CHES 2011 - 13th International Workshop Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Sep 2011, Nara, Japan. Springer, 6917, pp.192-206, 2011, LNCS - Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 〈10.1007/978-3-642-23951-9_13〉
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01109981
Contributeur : Brigitte Briot <>
Soumis le : mardi 27 janvier 2015 - 11:47:44
Dernière modification le : vendredi 25 mai 2018 - 12:02:05

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Eric Brier, David Naccache, Phong Q. Nguyen, Mehdi Tibouchi. Modulus Fault Attacks against RSA-CRT Signatures. Bart Preneel; Tsuyoshi Takagi. CHES 2011 - 13th International Workshop Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Sep 2011, Nara, Japan. Springer, 6917, pp.192-206, 2011, LNCS - Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 〈10.1007/978-3-642-23951-9_13〉. 〈hal-01109981〉

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