Decentralized Protection Strategies Against SIS Epidemics in Networks

Abstract : —Defining an optimal protection strategy against viruses, spam propagation or any other kind of contamination process is an important feature for designing new networks and architectures. In this work, we consider decentralized optimal protection strategies when a virus is propagating over a network through a SIS epidemic process. We assume that each node in the network can fully protect itself from infection at a constant cost, or the node can use recovery software, once it is infected. We model our system using a game theoretic framework and find pure, mixed equilibria, and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) in several network topologies. Further, we propose both a decentralized algorithm and an iterative procedure to compute a pure equilibrium in the general case of a multiple communities network. Finally, we evaluate the algorithms and give numerical illustrations of all our results.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [50 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01152459
Contributor : Eitan Altman <>
Submitted on : Sunday, May 17, 2015 - 4:13:10 PM
Last modification on : Friday, March 22, 2019 - 11:34:06 AM
Long-term archiving on : Thursday, April 20, 2017 - 12:47:09 AM

File

stoyan-tcns.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

Collections

Citation

Stojan Trajanovski, Yezekael Hayel, Eitan Altman, Huijuan Wang, Piet van Mieghem. Decentralized Protection Strategies Against SIS Epidemics in Networks. IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, IEEE, 2015, 2 (4), pp.406-419. ⟨10.1109/TCNS.2015.2426755⟩. ⟨hal-01152459⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

440

Files downloads

244