Implicit Zero-Knowledge Arguments and Applications to the Malicious Setting

Fabrice Benhamouda 1, 2, 3 Geoffroy Couteau 1, 2, 3 David Pointcheval 1, 3, 2 Hoeteck Wee 1, 2, 3
1 ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris
2 LIENS - Laboratoire d'informatique de l'école normale supérieure
3 CASCADE - Construction and Analysis of Systems for Confidentiality and Authenticity of Data and Entities
DI-ENS - Département d'informatique de l'École normale supérieure, Inria Paris-Rocquencourt, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique : UMR 8548
Abstract : We introduce \emph{implicit zero-knowledge} arguments (iZK) and simulation-sound variants thereof (SSiZK); these are lightweight alternatives to zero-knowledge arguments for enforcing semi-honest behavior. Our main technical contribution is a construction of efficient two-flow iZK and SSiZK protocols for a large class of languages under the (plain) DDH assumption in cyclic groups in the common reference string model. As an application of iZK, we improve upon the round-efficiency of existing protocols for securely computing inner product under the DDH assumption. This new protocol in turn provides privacy-preserving biometric authentication with lower latency.
Keywords : hash proof systems zero-knowledge malicious adversaries two-party computation inner product
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès
Rosario Gennaro; Matthew Robshaw. CRYPTO 2015, Aug 2015, Santa Barbara, United States. Springer, 9216, pp.23, 2015, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2015. 〈10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_6〉
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01187833
Contributeur : Fabrice Benhamouda <>
Soumis le : jeudi 27 août 2015 - 17:12:10
Dernière modification le : vendredi 25 mai 2018 - 12:02:05

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Fabrice Benhamouda, Geoffroy Couteau, David Pointcheval, Hoeteck Wee. Implicit Zero-Knowledge Arguments and Applications to the Malicious Setting. Rosario Gennaro; Matthew Robshaw. CRYPTO 2015, Aug 2015, Santa Barbara, United States. Springer, 9216, pp.23, 2015, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2015. 〈10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_6〉. 〈hal-01187833〉

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