HAL will be down for maintenance from Friday, June 10 at 4pm through Monday, June 13 at 9am. More information
Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Conference papers

Formal Verification of Control-flow Graph Flattening

Sandrine Blazy 1 Alix Trieu 2
1 CELTIQUE - Software certification with semantic analysis
IRISA-D4 - LANGAGE ET GÉNIE LOGICIEL, Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique
Abstract : Code obfuscation is emerging as a key asset in security by obscurity. It aims at hiding sensitive information in programs so that they become more difficult to understand and reverse engineer. Since the results on the impossibility of perfect and universal obfuscation, many obfuscation techniques have been proposed in the literature, ranging from simple variable encoding to hiding the control flow of a program. In this paper, we formally verify in Coq an advanced code obfuscation called control-flow graph flattening, that is used in stateof-the-art program obfuscators. Our control-flow graph flattening is a program transformation operating over C programs, that is integrated into the CompCert formally verified compiler. The semantics preservation proof of our program obfuscator relies on a simulation proof performed on a realistic language, the Clight language of CompCert. The automatic extraction of our program obfuscator into OCaml yields a program with competitive results.
Document type :
Conference papers
Complete list of metadata

Cited literature [18 references]  Display  Hide  Download

Contributor : Sandrine Blazy Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, May 27, 2016 - 11:29:50 AM
Last modification on : Wednesday, November 3, 2021 - 6:05:50 AM


Files produced by the author(s)



Sandrine Blazy, Alix Trieu. Formal Verification of Control-flow Graph Flattening. Certified Proofs and Programs (CPP 2016), Jan 2016, Saint-Petersburg, United States. pp.12, ⟨10.1145/2854065.2854082⟩. ⟨hal-01242063⟩



Record views


Files downloads