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Conference papers

Quantifying Information Leakage of Randomized Protocols

Abstract : The quantification of information leakage provides a quantitative evaluation of the security of a system. We propose the usage of Markovian processes to model and analyze the information leakage of deterministic and probabilistic systems. We show that this method generalizes the lattice of information approach and is a natural framework for modeling refined attackers capable to observe the internal behavior of the system. We also use our method to obtain an algorithm for the computation of channel capacity from our Markovian models. Finally, we show how to use the method to analyze timed and non-timed attacks on the Onion Routing protocol.
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01242614
Contributor : Fabrizio Biondi Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Sunday, December 13, 2015 - 2:37:37 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, February 2, 2022 - 3:50:55 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Monday, March 14, 2016 - 4:41:49 PM

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  • HAL Id : hal-01242614, version 1

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Fabrizio Biondi, Axel Legay, Pasquale Malacaria, Andrzej Wąsowski. Quantifying Information Leakage of Randomized Protocols. 14th International Conference on Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation, Feb 2013, Rome, Italy. ⟨hal-01242614⟩

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