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Automated Analysis of Security Protocols with Global State

Steve Kremer 1 Robert Künnemann 2
1 PESTO - Proof techniques for security protocols
Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
Abstract : Security APIs, key servers and protocols that need to keep the status of transactions, require to maintain a global, non-monotonic state, e.g., in the form of a database or register. However, most existing automated verification tools do not support the analysis of such stateful security protocols – sometimes because of fundamental reasons, such as the encoding of the protocol as Horn clauses, which are inherently monotonic. A notable exception is the recent tamarin prover which allows specifying protocols as multiset rewrite (msr) rules, a formalism expressive enough to encode state. As multiset rewriting is a " low-level " specification language with no direct support for concurrent message passing, encoding protocols correctly is a difficult and error-prone process. We propose a process calculus which is a variant of the applied pi calculus with constructs for manipulation of a global state by processes running in parallel. We show that this language can be translated to msr rules whilst preserving all security properties expressible in a dedicated first-order logic for security properties. The translation has been implemented in a prototype tool which uses the tamarin prover as a backend. We apply the tool to several case studies among which a simplified fragment of PKCS#11, the Yubikey security token, and an optimistic contract signing protocol.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, August 3, 2016 - 4:02:34 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, November 3, 2021 - 7:56:57 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Tuesday, November 8, 2016 - 8:26:52 PM


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Steve Kremer, Robert Künnemann. Automated Analysis of Security Protocols with Global State. Journal of Computer Security, IOS Press, 2016, 24 (5), ⟨10.3233/JCS-160556⟩. ⟨hal-01351388⟩



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