On Dynamic Games with Randomly Arriving Players

Pierre Bernhard 1 Marc Deschamps 2
1 BIOCORE - Biological control of artificial ecosystems
LOV - Laboratoire d'océanographie de Villefranche, CRISAM - Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée , INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique
Abstract : We consider a dynamic game where additional players (assumed identical , even if there will be a mild departure from that hypothesis) join the game randomly according to a Bernoulli process. The problem solved here is that of computing their expected payoff as a function of time and the number of players present when they arrive, if the strategies are given. We consider both a finite horizon game and an infinite horizon, discounted game. As illustrations , we discuss some examples relating to oligopoly theory (Cournot, Stackelberg, cartel).
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer Verlag, 2016, pp.34. 〈10.1007/s13235-016-0197-z〉
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Soumis le : mardi 3 janvier 2017 - 11:25:42
Dernière modification le : vendredi 12 janvier 2018 - 01:53:28
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Pierre Bernhard, Marc Deschamps. On Dynamic Games with Randomly Arriving Players. Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer Verlag, 2016, pp.34. 〈10.1007/s13235-016-0197-z〉. 〈hal-01425013〉



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