Formal verification of protocols based on short authenticated strings

Stéphanie Delaune 1 Steve Kremer 2 Ludovic Robin 2
1 EMSEC - EMbedded SEcurity and Cryptography
IRISA-D1 - SYSTÈMES LARGE ÉCHELLE
2 PESTO - Proof techniques for security protocols
Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
Abstract : Modern security protocols may involve humans in order to compare or copy short strings between different devices. Multi-factor authentication protocols, such as Google 2-factor or 3D-secure are typical examples of such protocols. However, such short strings may be subject to brute force attacks. In this paper we propose a symbolic model which includes attacker capabilities for both guessing short strings, and producing collisions when short strings result from an application of weak hash functions. We propose a new decision procedure for analysing (a bounded number of sessions of) protocols that rely on short strings. The procedure has been integrated in the AKISS tool and tested on protocols from the ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard.
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01528607
Contributor : Steve Kremer <>
Submitted on : Monday, May 29, 2017 - 1:08:56 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, February 7, 2019 - 4:50:55 PM
Long-term archiving on : Wednesday, September 6, 2017 - 10:58:23 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-01528607, version 1

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Stéphanie Delaune, Steve Kremer, Ludovic Robin. Formal verification of protocols based on short authenticated strings. CSF 2017 - 30th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, Aug 2017, Santa Barbara, United States. pp.14. ⟨hal-01528607⟩

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