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Security Margin Evaluation of SHA-3 Contest Finalists through SAT-Based Attacks

Abstract : In 2007, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced a public contest aiming at the selection of a new standard for a cryptographic hash function. In this paper, the security margin of five SHA-3 finalists is evaluated with an assumption that attacks launched on finalists should be practically verified. A method of attacks is called logical cryptanalysis where the original task is expressed as a SATisfiability problem. To simplify the most arduous stages of this type of cryptanalysis and helps to mount the attacks in a uniform way a new toolkit is used. In the context of SAT-based attacks, it has been shown that all the finalists have substantially bigger security margin than the current standards SHA-256 and SHA-1.
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Ekawat Homsirikamol, Paweł Morawiecki, Marcin Rogawski, Marian Srebrny. Security Margin Evaluation of SHA-3 Contest Finalists through SAT-Based Attacks. 11th International Conference on Computer Information Systems and Industrial Management (CISIM), Sep 2012, Venice, Italy. pp.56-67, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-33260-9_4⟩. ⟨hal-01551728⟩



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