# Practical Attacks on HB and HB+ Protocols

Abstract : HB and HB+ are a shared secret-key authentication protocols designed for low-cost devices such as RFID tags. HB+ was proposed by Juels and Weis at Crypto 2005. The security of the protocols relies on the “learning parity with noise” (LPN) problem, which was proven to be NP-hard.The best known attack on LPN by Levieil and Fouque [13] requires sub-exponential number of samples and sub-exponential number of operations, which makes that attack impractical for the RFID scenario (one cannot assume to collect exponentially-many observations of the protocol execution).We present a passive attack on HB protocol in detection-based model which requires only linear (in the length of a secret key) number of samples. Number of performed operations is exponential, but attack is efficient for some real-life values of the parameters, i. e. noise $\frac{1}{8}$ and key length 152-bits. Passive attack on HB can be transformed into active one on HB+.
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Cited literature [15 references]

https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01573292
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Submitted on : Wednesday, August 9, 2017 - 10:24:16 AM
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### Citation

Zbigniew Gołębiewski, Krzysztof Majcher, Filip Zagórski, Marcin Zawada. Practical Attacks on HB and HB+ Protocols. 5th Workshop on Information Security Theory and Practices (WISTP), Jun 2011, Heraklion, Crete, Greece. pp.244-253, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-21040-2_17⟩. ⟨hal-01573292⟩

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