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Designing virus-resistant, high-performance networks: a game-formation approach

Abstract : Designing an optimal network topology while balancing multiple, possibly conflicting objectives like cost, performance, and resiliency to viruses is a challenging endeavor, let alone in the case of decentralized network formation. We therefore propose a game-formation technique where each player aims to minimize its cost in installing links, the probability of being infected by a virus and the sum of hopcounts on its shortest paths to all other nodes. In this article, we (1) determine the Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy for our novel network formation game, (2) demonstrate that the Price of Anarchy (PoA) is usually low, which suggests that (near-)optimal topologies can be formed in a decentralized way, and (3) give suggestions for practitioners for those cases where the PoA is high and some centralized control/incentives are advisable.
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Submitted on : Thursday, August 17, 2017 - 5:02:03 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, December 8, 2020 - 3:38:45 AM


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  • HAL Id : hal-01575073, version 1


Stojan Trajanovski, Fernando Kuipers, Yezekael Hayel, Eitan Altman, Piet Mieghem. Designing virus-resistant, high-performance networks: a game-formation approach. IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, IEEE, 2017. ⟨hal-01575073⟩



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