Machine-Checked Proofs of Privacy for Electronic Voting Protocols

Abstract : We provide the first machine-checked proof of privacy-related properties (including ballot privacy) for an electronic voting protocol in the computational model. We target the popular Helios family of voting protocols, for which we identify appropriate levels of abstractions to allow the simplification and convenient reuse of proof steps across many variations of the voting scheme. The resulting framework enables machine-checked security proofs for several hundred variants of Helios and should serve as a stepping stone for the analysis of further variations of the scheme. In addition, we highlight some of the lessons learned regarding the gap between pen-and-paper and machine-checked proofs, and report on the experience with formalizing the security of protocols at this scale.
Document type :
Conference papers
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [40 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01624270
Contributor : Véronique Cortier <>
Submitted on : Thursday, October 26, 2017 - 10:39:59 AM
Last modification on : Wednesday, April 3, 2019 - 1:23:00 AM
Long-term archiving on : Saturday, January 27, 2018 - 1:38:24 PM

File

SP17(1).pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

Citation

Véronique Cortier, Catalin Dragan, François Dupressoir, Benedikt Schmidt, Pierre-Yves Strub, et al.. Machine-Checked Proofs of Privacy for Electronic Voting Protocols. 38th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'17), May 2017, San Jose, United States. pp.993 - 1008, ⟨10.1109/SP.2017.28⟩. ⟨hal-01624270⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

538

Files downloads

189