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A formal analysis of the Neuchâtel e-voting protocol

Abstract : Remote electronic voting is used in several countries for legally binding elections. Unlike academic voting protocols, these systems are not always documented and their security is rarely analysed rigorously. In this paper, we study a voting system that has been used for electing political representatives and in citizen-driven referenda in the Swiss canton of Neuchâtel. We design a detailed model of the protocol in ProVerif for both privacy and verifiability properties. Our analysis mostly confirms the security of the underlying protocol: we show that the Neuchâtel protocol guarantees ballot privacy, even against a corrupted server; it also ensures cast-as-intended and recorded-as-cast verifiability, even if the voter's device is compromised. To our knowledge, this is the first time a full-fledged automatic symbolic analysis of an e-voting system used for politically-binding elections has been realized.
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Contributor : Véronique Cortier Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Saturday, June 9, 2018 - 11:11:10 PM
Last modification on : Friday, February 4, 2022 - 3:34:25 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Wednesday, September 26, 2018 - 4:56:21 PM


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  • HAL Id : hal-01647150, version 1



Véronique Cortier, David Galindo, Mathieu Turuani. A formal analysis of the Neuchâtel e-voting protocol. EuroS&P 2018 - 3rd IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy, Apr 2018, Londres, United Kingdom. ⟨hal-01647150⟩



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