Verification of Randomized Distributed Algorithms under Round-Rigid Adversaries - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Preprints, Working Papers, ... Year :

Verification of Randomized Distributed Algorithms under Round-Rigid Adversaries

(1) , (2, 3) , (4) , (4)
1
2
3
4

Abstract

Randomized fault-tolerant distributed algorithms pose a number of challenges for automated verification: (i) parameterization in the number of processes and faults, (ii) randomized choices and probabilistic properties, and (iii) an unbounded number of asynchronous rounds. The combination of these challenges makes verification hard. Challenge (i) was recently addressed in the framework of threshold automata. We extend threshold automata to model randomized algorithms that perform an unbounded number of asynchronous rounds. For non-probabilistic properties, we show that it is necessary and sufficient to verify these properties under round-rigid schedules, that is, schedules where no process enters round r before all other processes finished round r −1. For almost-sure termination, we analyze these algorithms under round-rigid adversaries , that is, fair adversaries that only generate round-rigid schedules. This allows us to do compositional and inductive reasoning that reduces verification of the asynchronous multi-round algorithms to model checking of a one-round threshold automaton. We apply this framework to classic algorithms: Ben-Or's and Bracha's seminal consensus algorithms for crashes and Byzantine faults, 2-set agreement for crash faults, and RS-Bosco for the Byzantine case.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
main.pdf (719.44 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)
Loading...

Dates and versions

hal-01925533 , version 1 (16-11-2018)
hal-01925533 , version 2 (19-11-2018)
hal-01925533 , version 3 (19-04-2019)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-01925533 , version 3

Cite

Nathalie Bertrand, Igor Konnov, Marijana Lazic, Josef Widder. Verification of Randomized Distributed Algorithms under Round-Rigid Adversaries. 2019. ⟨hal-01925533v3⟩
844 View
296 Download

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More