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Breaking and Fixing the Security Proof of Garbled Bloom Filters

Abstract : We identify a flaw in the proof of security of Garbled Bloom Filters, a recent hash structure introduced by Dong et al. (ACM CCS 2013) that is used to design Private Set Intersection (PSI) protocols, a important family of protocols for secure cloud computing. We give counter-examples invalidating a claim that is central to the original proof and we show that variants of the GBF construction have the same issue in their security analysis. We then give a new proof of security that shows that Garbled Bloom Filters are secure nonetheless.
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Submitted on : Thursday, December 13, 2018 - 4:03:32 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, February 7, 2019 - 3:37:43 PM
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Cédric Van Rompay, Melek Önen. Breaking and Fixing the Security Proof of Garbled Bloom Filters. 32th IFIP Annual Conference on Data and Applications Security and Privacy (DBSec), Jul 2018, Bergamo, Italy. pp.263-277, ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-95729-6_17⟩. ⟨hal-01954406⟩



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