Blockchain competition between miners: a game theoretic perspective

Abstract : We model the competition over mining resources and over several cryptocurrencies as a non-cooperative game. Leveraging results about congestion games, we establish conditions for the existence of pure Nash equilibria and provide efficient algorithms for finding such equilibria. We account for multiple system models, varying according to the way that mining resources are allocated and shared and according to the granularity at which mining puzzle complexity is adjusted. When constraints on resources are included, the resulting game is a constrained resource allocation game for which we characterize a normalized Nash equilibrium. Under the proposed models, we provide structural properties of the corresponding types of equilibrium, e.g., establishing conditions under which at most two mining infrastructures will be active or under which no miners will have incentives to mine a given cryptocurrency.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [55 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal.inria.fr/hal-02411738
Contributor : Eitan Altman <>
Submitted on : Friday, January 24, 2020 - 2:10:36 AM
Last modification on : Sunday, January 26, 2020 - 1:25:16 AM

File

mininggames (1).pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

Citation

Eitan Altman, Daniel Menasché, Alexandre Reiffers, Mandar Datar, Swapnil Dhamal, et al.. Blockchain competition between miners: a game theoretic perspective. Frontiers in Blockchain, Frontiers, In press, ⟨10.3389/fbloc.2019.00026⟩. ⟨hal-02411738v2⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

23

Files downloads

11