Interception of Frequency-Hopping Signals for TEMPEST Attacks - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Conference Papers Year :

Interception of Frequency-Hopping Signals for TEMPEST Attacks

(1) , (1) , (1) , (1) , (2, 3) , (2)
1
2
3

Abstract

Any information system must ensure the confidentiality of its sensitive data during its operation. Among the vulnerabilities, TEMPEST attacks appear to be an important threat as this sensitive data can be emitted through unwanted electromagnetic waves generated by hardware operation and can therefore be intercepted by any distant radio frequency receiver. The menace is worst when sensitive data is mixed with an internal communication device as the leak is hidden within a legitimate communication channel and difficult to find. It can happen for instance when an audio processing unit like a microphone or amplifier is close to a transmission security (TRANSEC) transmitter, leading to the emanation of the audio signal through the TRANSEC which follows a frequency hopping scheme. This paper focuses on detection of the used channel of a frequency hopping system, when the system bandwidth is very large and the number of hops per second is very high (TRANSEC case). By obtaining this channel information, the audio stream can be recovered, leading to a potential high security break.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
lavaud20ressi.pdf (269.81 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-03027537 , version 1 (27-11-2020)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-03027537 , version 1

Cite

Corentin Lavaud, Robin Gerzaguet, Matthieu Gautier, Olivier Berder, Erwan Nogues, et al.. Interception of Frequency-Hopping Signals for TEMPEST Attacks. Rendez-vous de la Recherche et de l'Enseignement de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information, Dec 2020, Virtuelle, France. ⟨hal-03027537⟩
175 View
352 Download

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More