Compiling and Verifying Security Protocols

Florent Jacquemard 1 Michaël Rusinowitch 1 Laurent Vigneron
1 PROTHEO - Constraints, automatic deduction and software properties proofs
INRIA Lorraine, LORIA - Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications
Abstract : We propose a direct and fully automated translation from standard security protocol descriptions to rewrite rules. This compilation defines non-ambiguous operational semantics for protocols and intruder behavior: they are rewrite systems executed by applying a variant of ac-narrowing. The rewrite rules are processed by the theorem-prover DATAC. Multiple instances of a protocol can be run simultaneously as well as a model of the intruder (among several possible). The existence of flaws in the protocol is revealed by the derivation of an inconsistency. Our implementation of the compiler CASRUL, together with the prover DATAC, permitted us to derive security flaws in many classical cryptographic protocols.
Type de document :
[Research Report] RR-3938, INRIA. 2000, pp.25
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Soumis le : mercredi 24 mai 2006 - 10:40:57
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:19:58
Document(s) archivé(s) le : dimanche 4 avril 2010 - 20:43:45



  • HAL Id : inria-00072712, version 1



Florent Jacquemard, Michaël Rusinowitch, Laurent Vigneron. Compiling and Verifying Security Protocols. [Research Report] RR-3938, INRIA. 2000, pp.25. 〈inria-00072712〉



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