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Conference papers

The AVISS Security Protocol Analysis Tool

Alessandro Armando David Basin Mehdi Bouallagui 1 Yannick Chevalier 1 Luca Compagna Sebastian Moedersheim Michaël Rusinowitch 1 Mathieu Turuani 1 Luca Vigano Laurent Vigneron 1
1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174), Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
Abstract : We introduce AVISS, a tool for security protocol analysis that supports the integration of back-ends implementing different search techniques, allowing for their systematic and quandtitative comparison and paving the way to their effective interaction. As a significant example, we have implemented three back-ends, and used the AVISS tool to analyse and find flaws in 36 protocols, including 31 problems in the Clark-Jacob's protocol library and a previously unreported flaw in the Denning-Sacco protocol. || Nous présentons AVISS, un outil pour l'analyse de protocoles de sécurité qui supporte l'intégration de logiciels implantant différentes techniques de recherche, permettant de les comparer systématiquement et quantitativement, et de tracer un chemin vers l
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Submitted on : Tuesday, September 26, 2006 - 2:52:52 PM
Last modification on : Friday, January 21, 2022 - 3:08:55 AM


  • HAL Id : inria-00100915, version 1


Alessandro Armando, David Basin, Mehdi Bouallagui, Yannick Chevalier, Luca Compagna, et al.. The AVISS Security Protocol Analysis Tool. 14th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification - CAV'2002, Jul 2002, Copenhaguen, Denmark, pp.349-353. ⟨inria-00100915⟩



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