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Conference Papers Year : 2007

Economy-driven Shaping of Social Networks and Emerging Class Behaviors

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Abstract

In this paper, we propose an agent-based analysis of a cumulative social-network game. Agents grant loans to their neighbours to maximize their intertemporal utility function. With a complete graph, we show that interest rates converge toward the theoretical equilibrium, even if ther is no centralized walrasian auctioneer and no preference transmition between agents. With a dynamic network, we explain why the network can't stabilize with a rational strategy. We introduce death and show that, even if the rational strategy is individually the best, the situation where three different strategies coexist is better for the global welfare.
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Dates and versions

inria-00166089 , version 1 (31-07-2007)

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  • HAL Id : inria-00166089 , version 1

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Philippe Caillou, Frédéric Dubut, Michèle Sebag. Economy-driven Shaping of Social Networks and Emerging Class Behaviors. Artificial Economics 2007, 2007, Palerme, Italy. pp.195-208. ⟨inria-00166089⟩
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