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Economy-driven Shaping of Social Networks and Emerging Class Behaviors

Philippe Caillou 1, 2 Frédéric Dubut 1, 2 Michèle Sebag 1, 2
1 TANC - Algorithmic number theory for cryptology
Inria Saclay - Ile de France, LIX - Laboratoire d'informatique de l'École polytechnique [Palaiseau]
Abstract : In this paper, we propose an agent-based analysis of a cumulative social-network game. Agents grant loans to their neighbours to maximize their intertemporal utility function. With a complete graph, we show that interest rates converge toward the theoretical equilibrium, even if ther is no centralized walrasian auctioneer and no preference transmition between agents. With a dynamic network, we explain why the network can't stabilize with a rational strategy. We introduce death and show that, even if the rational strategy is individually the best, the situation where three different strategies coexist is better for the global welfare.
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Contributor : Philippe Caillou <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, July 31, 2007 - 4:43:41 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, July 8, 2021 - 3:47:48 AM
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  • HAL Id : inria-00166089, version 1



Philippe Caillou, Frédéric Dubut, Michèle Sebag. Economy-driven Shaping of Social Networks and Emerging Class Behaviors. Artificial Economics 2007, 2007, Palerme, Italy. pp.195-208. ⟨inria-00166089⟩



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