A Formal Theory of Key Conjuring.

Véronique Cortier 1 Stéphanie Delaune 1 Graham Steel 2
1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies, INRIA Lorraine, LORIA - Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications
Abstract : Key conjuring is the process by which an attacker obtains an unknown, encrypted key by repeatedly calling a cryptographic API function with random values in place of keys. We propose a formalism for detecting computationally feasible key conjuring operations, incorporated into a Dolev-Yao style model of the security API. We show that security in the presence of key conjuring operations is decidable for a particular class of APIs, which includes the key management API of IBM's Common Cryptographic Architecture (CCA).
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès
20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium - CSF'07, Jul 2007, Venice, Italy. IEEE Computer Society, pp.79-96, 2007
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https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00181612
Contributeur : Véronique Cortier <>
Soumis le : mercredi 24 octobre 2007 - 10:40:02
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:20:00

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  • HAL Id : inria-00181612, version 1

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Véronique Cortier, Stéphanie Delaune, Graham Steel. A Formal Theory of Key Conjuring.. 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium - CSF'07, Jul 2007, Venice, Italy. IEEE Computer Society, pp.79-96, 2007. 〈inria-00181612〉

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