A Formal Theory of Key Conjuring.

Véronique Cortier 1 Stéphanie Delaune 1 Graham Steel 2
1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174), INRIA Lorraine, LORIA - Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications
Abstract : Key conjuring is the process by which an attacker obtains an unknown, encrypted key by repeatedly calling a cryptographic API function with random values in place of keys. We propose a formalism for detecting computationally feasible key conjuring operations, incorporated into a Dolev-Yao style model of the security API. We show that security in the presence of key conjuring operations is decidable for a particular class of APIs, which includes the key management API of IBM's Common Cryptographic Architecture (CCA).
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Conference papers
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https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00181612
Contributor : Véronique Cortier <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, October 24, 2007 - 10:40:02 AM
Last modification on : Friday, July 6, 2018 - 3:06:10 PM

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  • HAL Id : inria-00181612, version 1

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Véronique Cortier, Stéphanie Delaune, Graham Steel. A Formal Theory of Key Conjuring.. 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium - CSF'07, Jul 2007, Venice, Italy. pp.79-96. ⟨inria-00181612⟩

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