Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Conference papers

Pride and Prejudice on a Centralized Academic Labor Market

Philippe Caillou 1, 2 Michèle Sebag 1, 2, 3, 4
2 TAO - Machine Learning and Optimisation
CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique : UMR8623, Inria Saclay - Ile de France, UP11 - Université Paris-Sud - Paris 11, LRI - Laboratoire de Recherche en Informatique
3 TANC - Algorithmic number theory for cryptology
Inria Saclay - Ile de France, LIX - Laboratoire d'informatique de l'École polytechnique [Palaiseau]
Abstract : The Academic Labor Market in France can be viewed as a constrained Stable Marriage problem, pairing universities and candidates according to their (elitist) preferences. A Multi-Agent based model, calibrated after the empirical evidence, is used to investigate how universities can recruit the best candidates with high confidence. Extensive simulations suggest that universities can be divided in four categories: top and medium universities have no difficulty in attracting the candidates they have selected, contrarily to good and bad universities. In this paper, a learning mechanism is presented: universities are allowed to tune their expectations depending on whether they did succeed to attract candidates in the previous recruitment rounds. The impact of over/under estimations is analyzed with respect to the hiring efficiency and quality.
Document type :
Conference papers
Complete list of metadata

Cited literature [11 references]  Display  Hide  Download
Contributor : Philippe Caillou Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Tuesday, June 9, 2009 - 2:04:15 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, July 8, 2021 - 3:48:00 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Monday, October 15, 2012 - 9:51:39 AM


Files produced by the author(s)


  • HAL Id : inria-00380541, version 1



Philippe Caillou, Michèle Sebag. Pride and Prejudice on a Centralized Academic Labor Market. Artificial Economics 09, Sep 2009, Valladolid, Spain. ⟨inria-00380541⟩



Les métriques sont temporairement indisponibles