Optimal Revocations in Ephemeral Networks: A Game-Theoretic Framework

Abstract : Revocation of public-key certificates is an important security primitive. In this paper, we design a fully distributed local certificate revocation scheme for ephemeral networks – a class of extremely volatile wireless networks with short-duration and short-range communications - based on a game-theoretic approach. First, by providing incentives, we can guarantee the successful revocation of the malicious nodes even if they collude. Second, thanks to the records of past behavior, we dynamically adapt the parameters to nodes' reputations and establish the optimal Nash equilibrium (NE) on-the-fly, minimizing the social cost of the revocation. Third, based on the analytical results, we define a unique optimal NE selection protocol and evaluate its performance through simulations. We show that our scheme is effective in quickly and efficiently removing malicious devices from the network.
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès
WiOpt'10: Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, May 2010, Avignon, France. pp.184-193, 2010
Liste complète des métadonnées

Littérature citée [14 références]  Voir  Masquer  Télécharger

https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00496637
Contributeur : Service Ist Inria Sophia Antipolis-Méditerranée / I3s <>
Soumis le : jeudi 1 juillet 2010 - 08:59:51
Dernière modification le : lundi 2 octobre 2017 - 16:06:02
Document(s) archivé(s) le : lundi 4 octobre 2010 - 11:46:59

Fichier

p184-bilogrevic.pdf
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : inria-00496637, version 1

Collections

Citation

Igor Bilogrevic, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Maxim Raya, Jean-Pierre Hubaux. Optimal Revocations in Ephemeral Networks: A Game-Theoretic Framework. WiOpt'10: Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, May 2010, Avignon, France. pp.184-193, 2010. 〈inria-00496637〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

72

Téléchargements de fichiers

158