WORST CASE ATTACKS AGAINST BINARY PROBABILISTIC TRAITOR TRACING CODES

Teddy Furon 1 Luis Pérez-Freire 2, 3
1 TEMICS - Digital image processing, modeling and communication
IRISA - Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires, Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique
Abstract : This article deals with traitor tracing which is also known as active fingerprinting, content serialization, or user forensics. We study the impact of worst case attacks on the well-known Tardos binary prob- abilistic traitor tracing code, and especially its optimum setups re- cently advised by Amiri and Tardos, and by Huang and Moulin. This paper assesses that these optimum setups are robust in the sense that a discrepancy between the foreseen numbers of colluders and the its actual value doesn't spoil the achievable rate of a joint decoder. On the other hand, this discrepancy might have a dramatic impact on a single decoder. Since the complexity of the today's joint decoder is prohibitive, this paper mitigates the interest of the optimum setups.
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Teddy Furon, Luis Pérez-Freire. WORST CASE ATTACKS AGAINST BINARY PROBABILISTIC TRAITOR TRACING CODES. IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, Dec 2009, London, United Kingdom. ⟨inria-00505886⟩

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