Verifying Cryptographic Protocols with Subterms Constraints

Yannick Chevalier 1 Denis Lugiez 2 Michael Rusinowitch 3
3 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174), INRIA Lorraine, LORIA - Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications
Abstract : Known protocol analysis techniques consider protocols where some piece of information expected in a protocol message is located at a fixed position. However this is too restrictive to model web-services where messages are XML semi-structured documents and where significant information (such as name, signature, ...) has to be extracted from nodes occurring at flexible positions. Therefore we have extended the Dolev Yao model by a subterm predicate that allows one to express data extraction by subterm matching. This also allows one to detect so-called rewriting attacks that are specific to web-services.
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Conference papers
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https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00557710
Contributor : Michaël Rusinowitch <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, January 19, 2011 - 5:48:49 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, June 27, 2019 - 4:27:42 PM

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Yannick Chevalier, Denis Lugiez, Michael Rusinowitch. Verifying Cryptographic Protocols with Subterms Constraints. 14th International Conference on Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence, and Reasoning - LPAR 2007, Oct 2007, Yerevan, Armenia. pp.181-195, ⟨10.1007/978-3-540-75560-9_15⟩. ⟨inria-00557710⟩

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