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A formal analysis of the Norwegian e-voting protocol

Véronique Cortier 1 Cyrille Wiedling 1
1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174), Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
Abstract : Norway has used e-voting in its last political election in September 2011, with more than 25 000 voters using the e-voting option. The underlying protocol is a new protocol designed by the ERGO group, involving several actors (a bulletin box but also a receipt generator, a decryption service, and an auditor). Of course, trusting the correctness and security of e-voting protocols is crucial in that context. Formal definitions of properties such as privacy, coercion-resistance or verifiability have been recently proposed, based on equivalence properties. In this paper, we propose a formal analysis of the protocol used in Norway, w.r.t. privacy, consid- ering several corruption scenarios. Part of this study has conducted using the ProVerif tool, on a simplified model.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, October 26, 2011 - 5:33:25 PM
Last modification on : Friday, January 21, 2022 - 3:09:05 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Thursday, March 30, 2017 - 6:11:39 PM


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  • HAL Id : inria-00636115, version 1


Véronique Cortier, Cyrille Wiedling. A formal analysis of the Norwegian e-voting protocol. [Research Report] RR-7781, INRIA. 2011. ⟨inria-00636115⟩



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