Automated analysis of security protocols with global state

Steve Kremer 1 Robert Künnemann 2
1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174), Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
Abstract : Security APIs, key servers and protocols that need to keep the status of transactions, require to maintain a global, non-monotonic state, e.g., in the form of a database or register. However, most existing automated verification tools do not support the analysis of such stateful security protocols - sometimes because of fundamental reasons, such as the encoding of the protocol as Horn clauses, which are inherently monotonic. A notable exception is the recent tamarin prover which allows specifying protocols as multiset rewrite (msr) rules, a formalism expressive enough to encode state. As multiset rewriting is a "low-level" specification language with no direct support for concurrent message passing, encoding protocols correctly is a difficult and error-prone process. We propose a process calculus which is a variant of the applied pi calculus with constructs for manipulation of a global state by processes running in parallel. We show that this language can be translated to msr rules whilst preserving all security properties expressible in a dedicated first-order logic for security properties. The translation has been implemented in a prototype tool which uses the tamarin prover as a backend. We apply the tool to several case studies among which a simplified fragment of PKCS#11, the Yubikey security token, and an optimistic contract signing protocol.
Type de document :
[Research Report] arXiv. 2014, pp.56
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Contributeur : Steve Kremer <>
Soumis le : lundi 12 mai 2014 - 16:42:54
Dernière modification le : vendredi 6 juillet 2018 - 15:06:10
Document(s) archivé(s) le : mardi 12 août 2014 - 10:50:30


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  • HAL Id : hal-00955869, version 2
  • ARXIV : 1403.1142


Steve Kremer, Robert Künnemann. Automated analysis of security protocols with global state. [Research Report] arXiv. 2014, pp.56. 〈hal-00955869v2〉



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