Quantifying Information Leakage of Randomized Protocols

Abstract : The quantification of information leakage provides a quantitative evaluation of the security of a system. We propose the usage of Markovian processes to model deterministic and probabilistic systems. By using a methodology generalizing the lattice of information approach we model refined attackers capable to observe the internal behavior of the system, and quantify the information leakage of such systems. We also use our method to obtain an algorithm for the computation of channel capacity from our Markovian models. Finally, we show how to use the method to analyze timed and non-timed attacks on the Onion Routing protocol.
Liste complète des métadonnées

Littérature citée [32 références]  Voir  Masquer  Télécharger

https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01088193
Contributeur : Fabrizio Biondi <>
Soumis le : jeudi 27 novembre 2014 - 15:24:29
Dernière modification le : jeudi 17 mai 2018 - 12:52:03
Document(s) archivé(s) le : vendredi 14 avril 2017 - 22:03:05

Fichier

main.pdf
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Identifiants

Citation

Fabrizio Biondi, Axel Legay, Pasquale Malacaria, Andrzej Wąsowski. Quantifying Information Leakage of Randomized Protocols. Theoretical Computer Science, Elsevier, 2014, pp.68 - 87. 〈10.1007/978-3-642-35873-9_7〉. 〈hal-01088193〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

403

Téléchargements de fichiers

184