Games with Communication: from Belief to Preference Change

Guillaume Aucher 1, 2 Bastien Maubert 3 Sophie Pinchinat 4 François Schwarzentruber 5, 4
3 CELLO - Computational Epistemic Logic in LOrraine
LORIA - NLPKD - Department of Natural Language Processing & Knowledge Discovery
4 LogicA - Logic and Applications
ENS Cachan - École normale supérieure - Cachan, UR1 - Université de Rennes 1, IRISA-D4 - LANGAGE ET GÉNIE LOGICIEL
Abstract : In this work we consider simple extensive-form games with two players, Player A and Player B, where Player B can make announcements about his strategy. Player A has then to revise her preferences about her strategies, so as to better respond to the strategy she believes Player B will play. We propose a generic framework that combines methods and techniques from belief revision theory and social choice theory to address this problem. Additionally, we design a logic that Player A can use to reason and decide how to play in such games.
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Guillaume Aucher, Bastien Maubert, Sophie Pinchinat, François Schwarzentruber. Games with Communication: from Belief to Preference Change. Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (PRIMA 2015), Oct 2015, Bertinoro, Italy. ⟨hal-01194398⟩

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