An Automated Formal Process for Detecting Fault Injection Vulnerabilities in Binaries and Case Study on PRESENT -- Extended Version

Thomas Given-Wilson 1 Nisrine Jafri 1 Jean-Louis Lanet 1 Axel Legay 1
1 TAMIS - Threat Analysis and Mitigation for Information Security
Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique , IRISA_D4 - LANGAGE ET GÉNIE LOGICIEL
Abstract : Recently fault injection has increasingly been used both to attack software applications, and to test system robustness. Detecting fault injection vulnerabilities has been approached with a variety of different but limited methods. This paper proposes a general process without these limitations that uses model checking to detect fault injection vulnerabilities in binaries. The efficacy of this process is demonstrated by detecting vulnerabilities in the PRESENT binary.
Type de document :
Pré-publication, Document de travail
2017
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01400283
Contributeur : Thomas Given-Wilson <>
Soumis le : mardi 4 avril 2017 - 20:26:23
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:28:14

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  • HAL Id : hal-01400283, version 2

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Thomas Given-Wilson, Nisrine Jafri, Jean-Louis Lanet, Axel Legay. An Automated Formal Process for Detecting Fault Injection Vulnerabilities in Binaries and Case Study on PRESENT -- Extended Version. 2017. 〈hal-01400283v2〉

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