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Verified Translation Validation of Static Analyses

Abstract : Motivated by applications to security and high efficiency , we propose an automated methodology for validating on low-level intermediate representations the results of a source-level static analysis. Our methodology relies on two main ingredients: a relative-safety checker, an instance of a relational verifier which proves that a program is "safer" than another, and a transformation of programs into defensive form which verifies the analysis results at runtime. We prove the soundness of the methodology, and provide a formally verified instantiation based on the Verasco verified C static analyzer and the CompCert verified C compiler. We experiment with the effectiveness of our approach with client optimizations at RTL level, and static analyses for cache-based timing side-channels and memory usage at pre-assembly levels.
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01588422
Contributor : Alix Trieu <>
Submitted on : Friday, September 15, 2017 - 4:13:22 PM
Last modification on : Friday, June 11, 2021 - 3:34:04 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Saturday, December 16, 2017 - 2:03:29 PM

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  • HAL Id : hal-01588422, version 1

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Gilles Barthe, Sandrine Blazy, Vincent Laporte, David Pichardie, Alix Trieu. Verified Translation Validation of Static Analyses. Computer Security Foundations Symposium, Aug 2017, Santa-Barbara, United States. ⟨hal-01588422⟩

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