Stochastic Coalitional Better-Response Dynamics for Finite Games with Application to Network Formation Games

Abstract : In a repeated play of a strategic game over infinite horizon, a Nash equilibrium that is played in the long run depends on an initial action profile as well as the way all the players choose their actions at each time.
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-02372761
Contributor : Konstantin Avrachenkov <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, November 20, 2019 - 3:43:15 PM
Last modification on : Monday, January 13, 2020 - 1:17:23 AM

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Konstantin Avrachenkov, Vikas Vikram Singh. Stochastic Coalitional Better-Response Dynamics for Finite Games with Application to Network Formation Games. Altman, Eitan; Avrachenkov, Konstantin; De Pellegrini, Francesco; El-Azouzi, Rachid; Wang, Huijuan. Multilevel Strategic Interaction Game Models for Complex Networks, Springer International Publishing, pp.185-199, 2019, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-24455-2_10⟩. ⟨hal-02372761⟩

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