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Conference papers

How to fake zero-knowledge proofs, again

Véronique Cortier 1 Pierrick Gaudry 2 Quentin Yang 1, 3
1 PESTO - Proof techniques for security protocols
Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
2 CARAMBA - Cryptology, arithmetic : algebraic methods for better algorithms
Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - ALGO - Department of Algorithms, Computation, Image and Geometry
Abstract : In 2012, Bernhard et al. showed that the Fiat-Shamir heuristic must be used with great care in zero-knowledge proofs. We explain how, in the Belenios voting system, while not using the weak version of Fiat-Shamir, there is still a gap that allows to fake a zero-knowledge proof in certain circumstances. Therefore an attacker who corrupts the voting server and the decryption trustees could break verifiability.
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-02928953
Contributor : Pierrick Gaudry <>
Submitted on : Thursday, September 3, 2020 - 9:30:02 AM
Last modification on : Friday, September 4, 2020 - 3:32:01 AM

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Véronique Cortier, Pierrick Gaudry, Quentin Yang. How to fake zero-knowledge proofs, again. E-Vote-Id 2020 - The International Conference for Electronic Voting, 2020, Bregenz / virtual, Austria. ⟨hal-02928953⟩

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