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Conference papers

How to fake zero-knowledge proofs, again

Véronique Cortier 1 Pierrick Gaudry 2 Quentin Yang 1, 3 
1 PESTO - Proof techniques for security protocols
Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
2 CARAMBA - Cryptology, arithmetic : algebraic methods for better algorithms
Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - ALGO - Department of Algorithms, Computation, Image and Geometry
Abstract : In 2012, Bernhard et al. showed that the Fiat-Shamir heuristic must be used with great care in zero-knowledge proofs. We explain how, in the Belenios voting system, while not using the weak version of Fiat-Shamir, there is still a gap that allows to fake a zero-knowledge proof in certain circumstances. Therefore an attacker who corrupts the voting server and the decryption trustees could break verifiability.
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Submitted on : Thursday, September 3, 2020 - 9:30:02 AM
Last modification on : Friday, February 4, 2022 - 3:12:40 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Wednesday, December 2, 2020 - 6:01:59 PM


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  • HAL Id : hal-02928953, version 1


Véronique Cortier, Pierrick Gaudry, Quentin Yang. How to fake zero-knowledge proofs, again. E-Vote-Id 2020 - The International Conference for Electronic Voting, 2020, Bregenz / virtual, Austria. ⟨hal-02928953⟩



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