Acyclic Preference Systems in P2P Networks

Abstract : In this work we study preference systems natural for the Peer-to-Peer paradigm. Most of them fall in three categories: global, symmetric and complementary. All these systems share an acyclicity property. As a consequence, they admit a stable (or Pareto efficient) configuration, where no participant can collaborate with better partners than their current ones. We analyze the representation of the such preference systems and show that any acyclic system can be represented with a symmetric mark matrix. This gives a method to merge acyclic preference systems and retain the acyclicity. We also consider such properties of the corresponding collaboration graph, as clustering coefficient and diameter. In particular, studying the example of preferences based on real latency measurements, we observe that its stable configuration is a small-world graph.
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[Research Report] RR-6174, INRIA. 2007, pp.9
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Soumis le : mercredi 2 mai 2007 - 15:06:03
Dernière modification le : vendredi 25 mai 2018 - 12:02:03
Document(s) archivé(s) le : mardi 21 septembre 2010 - 13:06:31


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  • HAL Id : inria-00143790, version 2
  • ARXIV : 0704.3904



Anh-Tuan Gai, Dmitry Lebedev, Fabien Mathieu, Fabien De Montgolfier, Julien Reynier, et al.. Acyclic Preference Systems in P2P Networks. [Research Report] RR-6174, INRIA. 2007, pp.9. 〈inria-00143790v2〉



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